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What’s your [mis]fortune cookie say? 
What is quality? 
“The standard of something as measured against 
other things of a similar kind; the degree of excellence of 
something.” 
Oxford English Dictionary 
What is quality? 
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Oxford English Dictionary 
Standards and measures 
DO 178C 
IEC 61508 
EN 50128 
Standards can help you figure out what, and 
sometimes how, you should measure 
NASA-STD-8719.13 
MISRA C++ 
MISRA C CWE JSF++ Cert-C 
HIS 
Your software quality plan should help you 
figure out when to measure 
The impetus of software quality 
required software quality ∝ software value  
axiom 
The value of the software, 
from the customer’s 
perspecrive, should drive the 
quality requirements. 
Understand the value 
Why do you buy 
Grandma a laptop? 
Its got great specs! 
9,000 mAH Li+ battery 
1TB SSD HD 
2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 
720p Webcam 
So she can see 
pictures of the kids 
on Facebook 
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Specifications to enable value 
Requirements 
•Customer driven 
requirements 
•Industry driven 
process requirements 
•Regulations 
•Explicit quality 
requirements 
•Budget – Cost 
•Budget – Time 
•Budget – Resources 
Operational 
Constraints 
Pre-existing 
solution(s) 
•Legacy software 
•COTS sotware 
•Libraries 
Don’t overcomplicate; focus on what is 
important to the customer 
Value is realized as capability  
Capability 
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 3 Subsystem 2 
Software 
module 1 
Software 
module 3 
Software 
module 2 Software 
module 4 
Software 
module 6 
Software 
module 5 
Protecting value from risk 
Unmitigated risks degrade delivered value 
axiom 
Risks that could prevent the 
customer from realizing a 
desired capability indicate the 
value of the software itself is 
at risk. 
Each module is scored 1-5 per factors below 
Per software module risk assessment 
Risk Level 3 ≈ [14-25] 
Risk Level 2 ≈ [7-13] 
Risk Level 1 ≈ [0-6] 
Impact Factors 
Performance 
Operational S/W Control 
Human Safety 
Likelihood Factors 
Complexity 
Testability 
Degree of Innovation 
Developer Characteristics 
1 
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1  Likelihood  5 
Weighted 
Averages 
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Scaled 
Risk flows up to capabilities 
Capability 
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 3 Subsystem 2 
Software 
module 1 
Software 
module 3 
Software 
module 2 Software 
module 4 
Software 
module 6 
Software 
module 5 
Risk Level 1 
Risk Level 2 
Risk Level 3 
Software Modules 
None 
Math 
GNC 
Attitude Control 
Navigation 
Math 
GNC 
Attitude Control 
Navigation 
Battery 
Power 
Thermal 
FSW 
Telecom 
Downlink 
Uplink 
Command 
Telemetry 
Software Component 
None 
Trajectory Control 
Attitude Control 
Establish and Maintain Power 
Establish and Maintain Thermal 
Control 
Perform Fault Detection 
Establish and Maintain 
Communication 
Capability 
Launch to Orbit 
Approach to Target 
Maintain Flight 
Systems 
Leverage the progress of others 
There is no reason to repeat 
the same mistake; make sure 
to mitigate known risks with 
proven risk mitigation 
techniques. 
Start with known mitigations for known risks 
axiom 
Known risks: Enemies of Quality 
Unrealistic expectations 
Incorrect specification 
Bad coding practices and constructs 
Inadequate testing 
Example risk mitigation activities 
Building the right thing 
• Prototyping 
• Simulation 
• Requirements tracing 
• Design reviews 
Building the thing well 
• Code generation 
• Unit testing 
• Coding standards 
• Code reviews 
• Monte Carlo testing 
Confirmation of building the right 
thing well 
• Static analysis 
• Integration testing 
• Coverage testing 
• Code metrics 
Other Risk Mitigations 
• Independent verification and validation 
• Experience and training 
• Continuous quality plan re-evaluation 
Each of these mitigation activities combats one 
or more of enemies of quality. 
Scope with the risk assesment 
Since exhaustive testing is 
out of reach, risk mitigation 
activities should be scoped 
relative to the determined risk 
levels. 
Risk mitigation ∝  risk level 
axiom 
Example risk mitigation scoping 
Risk Level 3 ≈ [14-25] 
Risk Level 2 ≈ [7-13] 
Risk Level 1 ≈ [0-6] 
Validation activities, medium rigor 
Static verification activities, medium rigor 
Validation activities, medium rigor  
Dynamic verification activities, medium rigor 
Static verification activities, high rigor 
Validation activities, high rigor  
Each risk level dictates risk mitigation methods 
applied with specific levels of rigor. 
An analogy for rigor 
How 
Rigor of 
strategy 
application 
How many 
stones do I 
need to look 
under? 
Rigor applied to static code analysis 
SQO 4 
SQO 3 
SQO 2 
SQO 1  
• Identify systematic run-time errors 
• Analyze non-terminating constructs 
• Analyze first set of potential run-
time errors  
• Analyze unreachable branches 
• Analyze second set of potential 
run-time errors 
• Identify external interfaces and 
perform tainted data analysis  
• Analyze third set of potential 
run-time errors 
• Apply coding standard X checks 
• Prove code safe  
Assurance Task SQO Level 1 SQO Level 2 SQO Level 3 SQO Level 4 SQO Level 5 SQO Level 6
Develop Quality Plan (AT-1) X X X X X X
Identify Software Build Information (AT-2) X X X X X X
Identify Source Code Metrics (AT-3) X X X X X X
Apply Standards Based Rules (AT-4)
OPTIONAL 
per IV&V 
effort
OPTIONAL per 
IV&V effort
OPTIONAL 
per IV&V 
effort
OPTIONAL 
per IV&V 
effort
OPTIONAL per 
IV&V effort
OPTIONAL per 
IV&V effort
Identify Systematic Runtime Errors (AT-5) X X X X X
Analyze Non Terminating Constructs (AT-6) X X X X X
Analyze Unreachable Branches (AT-7) X X X X
Identify External Interfaces (AT-8) X X X
Analyze First Subset of Potential Runtime 
Errors (AT-9) X X X
Analyze Second Subset of Potential 
Runtime Errors (AT-10) X X
Analyze Third Subset of Potential Runtime 
Errors (AT-11) X
Prove Code Safe (AT-12)
X (targeted 
modules)
Perform Tainted Data Analysis (AT-13)
OPTIONAL or 
Required for 
Information 
Assurance/Secur
ity Focused 
Analysis
OPTIONAL or 
Required for 
Information 
Assurance/Securi
ty Focused 
Analysis
Perform Dataflow Analysis (AT-14) X
Rigor applied to static code analysis 
Rigor applied to static code analysis 
Impact List Impact Definition Impact Level SQO Level 
MISRA or standards 
compliance 
Neither causes harm to the system nor a programmer mistake. These are simply good practices or generally 
accepted standards to follow. Trivial 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
Deadlock Two or more threads are waiting for each other to finish causing the process to freeze. These are related to Semaphores, Mutexes, and Race conditions. Critical 
2,3,4,5,6 
Memory leak Improper memory management. These involve improper or neglected deallocation or use of memory. Minor - Major 2,3,4,5,6 
System crash Impacts system/crew safety which could lead to Loss of vehicle, loss of mission, or loss of life. Critical 2,3,4,5,6 
Undefined behavior Code defects whose behavior is not specified under certain conditions. The behavior may vary depending on the implementation, environment, or semantics. Resulting behavior can range from benign to critical. Major - Critical 
2,3,4,5,6 
Possible programmer 
mistake 
Does not cause any major or critical issues, but areas in code that may be worth a look to determine if code was 
intentional or not. Minor 
3,4,5,6 
Unexpected behavior 
or results 
Suspicious code that may negatively affect the behavior, code flow, or calculation result if the code was not 
programmed as intended. Minor - Major 
3,4,5,6 
Unreachable code Written code that will not be executed. These could either be commented out code or defensive code. Worth investigating to see if intentional. Minor - Major 
3,4,5,6 
Data loss Chance to truncate data when assigning between objects, storing results of a calculation, or passing data as arguments, when the new storage type is smaller. Major 
4,5,6 
Data exposure Security vulnerability allowing supposedly inaccessible or private data to be modified by a malicious user. Minor - Major 5,6 
Security Security vulnerabilities that do not overlap with another impact category. These include the use of unsafe functions, unverified or tainted inputs, or weaknesses prone to user exploitation. Minor - Major 
5,6 
Code cleanliness Good practices to observe near the completion of a project such as declaring objects as const or non-const when appropriate. Trivial 
6 
Performance Impacts system performance such as timing or memory usage. Minor 6 
Portability or cause 
compile issues 
Code defects that may not be an issue on the current system but may not work if compiled on a different 
environment or if implementation was not well understood. Trivial 
6 
Readability and 
maintainability 
No impact on the system other than the possibility of confusion if code was shared/maintained by multiple 
developers or reused in another project without proper rationale included. Trivial 
6 
Redefined behavior Built-in commands or operators are overloaded or redefined to have new behavior. May cause confusion, however it is a non-issue if the system is well understood and documented. Trivial - Minor 
6 
Unused data Possible development oversight. A parameter, status or calculation result was not used, indicating there may have been an initial intent but forgotten. Minor 
6 
Risk 
Analysis 
Operational 
Constraints 
Risk mitigation 
adjustments 
Software 
Quality Plan 
Possible risk 
mitigation activities 
Known Risks 
Software 
Quality Plan 
Creation 
Requirements 
Pre-existing 
solution(s) 
Propose 
Solution 
Risk Assessment 
Criteria 
Putting it all together 
Software quality plan reassesment 
• Budget – Cost Change 
• Requirements - Scope 
Creep 
• Schedule Slip 
• New Risk Mitigation 
Strategies 
New Inputs 
Software 
Quality Plan 
Re-evaluate 
Software 
Quality Plan 
Your quality plan is an evolving, living process. 
What can IV&V provide? 
• Code analysis 
• Simulation 
• Proven evidence based approach 
Assurance 
• Subject matter experts  
Cost savings 
• Safe 
• Error Free 
• Meet your needs 
Confidence 
What can MathWorks provide? 
• MATLAB, Simulink, Polyspace and more 
Tools 
• Consulting  
• Training 
• Process assessment 
• Model Based Design guidance 
Expertise 
• File Exchange 
• MATLAB Answers 
• Blogs 
Community 
Contribute or ask questions 
NASA IV&V 
Dan Painter :: 
joseph.d.painter@nasa.gov 
MathWorks 
Matt Rhodes :: 
matt.rhodes@mathworks.com 
